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Abstract This article addresses the problem of anti-spoofing protection in an automatic
speaker verification (ASV) system. An improved version of a previously proposed spoof-
ing countermeasure is presented. The presented method is based on the analysis of linear
prediction error that results from both short- and long-term prediction of the input speech
signal. It was observed that non-natural speech signals, i.e., synthetic or converted speech,
were predicted in a different way than genuine speech. Therefore, in contrast to the classi-
cal linear prediction analysis, where usually only the prediction coefficients are analyzed, in
the proposed approach the residual (error) signals were examined. During this analysis, 23
various prediction parameters were extracted, such as the energy of the prediction error, pre-
diction gains and temporal parameters related to the prediction error signals. Various binary
classifiers were researched to separate human and spoof classes, however the support vec-
tor machines with radial basis function (SVM-RBF) yielded the best results. When tested
on the corpora provided for the ASVspoof 2015 Challenge, the proposed countermeasure
returned better results than the previous version of the algorithm and, in most of the cases,
the baseline spoofing detector based on the local binary patterns (LBP). It is hoped that the
proposed method can be part of a generalized spoofing countermeasure helping to increase
security of ASV systems.
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1 Introduction
User authorization based on a human voice, often referred to as speaker verification, is
becoming more and more popular. Automatic speaker verification systems (ASVs) are used
to authorize access, e.g., to a mobile phone, or to authenticate customers over a phone line.
The latter application is already used, e.g., by banks such as Bank Smart in Poland [5], or
public institutions, such as the Australian Taxation Office [4].
Similar to other biometric modalities, systems based on voice are also prone to spoofing,
i.e., attacks to get illegitimate access. In the context of ASV systems, spoofing is realized
by presenting artificial or manipulated speech, which can be generated using, e.g., speech
synthesis or voice conversion algorithms. Since these techniques are becoming more easily
available and are constantly improving their quality, they have begun to pose a major threat
to ASV systems. Quite recently, researchers have started to investigate how much ASV
systems are prone to spoofing using various methods. Various researchers have worked on
assessing the threat caused by imitators [13, 23], speech synthesis [26, 35], converted speech
[22, 39] or replay of previously acquired recordings [3, 24]. In parallel, much effort has
been invested in work on various spoofing countermeasures. These algorithms can be either
dedicated to a given attack or can be generally applicable. A thorough review of spoofing
methods and their countermeasures can be found in [40].
In [19] a novel spoofing countermeasure was proposed. It was based on analysis of lin-
ear prediction error and used a logistic classifier as a detection algorithm. The idea of this
algorithm was inspired by the fact that synthetic or converted voice is quite likely to be
either very easily predicted, if generated with a simplified acoustic model, or very diffi-
cult to predict, if any artifacts in the signal are present. Experiments conducted using the
datasets provided by the organizers of the first ASV Spoofing and Countermeasures Chal-
lenge ASVspoof 2015 [41] showed that the proposed method was able to detect spoofing
effectuated with voice conversion and speech synthesis. When testing spoofing detection
independently from an ASV system, it yielded an equal error rate (EER) of less than 9 % for
the Development corpus, while the baseline method based on local binary patterns (LBP)
resulted in an EER higher than 14 %.
The work described in this article is the continuation of the author’s research aiming
to contribute to the speech community’s efforts to find efficient anti-spoofing methods for
ASV systems. In the current study, a new version of the spoofing detection algorithm was
proposed. It uses an extended set of parameters and employs a new, more powerful classifier.
The performance of this anti-spoofing protection is compared with the previous version of
this algorithm [19] as well as with the results of the detector based on LBPs, which has been
efficient in other studies [2].
In this article, first the state-of-the-art in spoofing countermeasures is summarized and
the basics of linear prediction theory are recalled. Then, in Section 3 the proposed counter-
measure is presented and compared with its previous version. In Section 4 the experimental
set-up is described. In Section 5 the results are presented and compared with the results from
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the previous version of the algorithm and the LPB-based countermeasure. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper and presents perspectives for future work.
2 Previous work
2.1 Spoofing countermeasures for ASV systems
One group of countermeasures exploits prior knowledge about the origin of the spoof-
ing attack. For example, some algorithms detect artifacts typical of speech synthesis, such
as simplification of F0 contours [27]. In [1] the authors proposed an algorithm that was
based on measuring the pair-wise distance (PWD) between spectral parameters (such as lin-
ear prediction coefficients or Mel-cepstral coefficients) in consecutive frames. The authors
claimed that voice conversion decreases PWD values and, as a consequence, changes PWD
distributions. They compared speaker-dependent PWD distributions between genuine and
converted speech using speech data from the NIST’06 database and the NIST SRE proto-
col. The authors showed that the proposed countermeasure was able to lower the EER from
more than 30 % to below 3 %.
Countermeasures dedicated to detecting replay attacks often try to identify unexpected
channel artifacts indicative of recording and replaying. Such algorithms were reported
in [37], for which the EER of a baseline GMM-UBM system was shown to decrease from
40 % to 10 % with active countermeasures. Another replay countermeasure aimed at detect-
ing far-field recordings, which are unlikely in natural access scenarios where the speaker is
usually close to the microphone [36].
Not many algorithms have so far been reported that claim to be more generally applica-
ble and less dependent on prior knowledge of the attack. For example, one group of such
methods exploits the fact that many speech synthesis and voice conversion algorithms dis-
turb the natural phase of the speech signal. In [9] the authors challenged GMM-UBM and
SVM-GMM speaker verification systems with genuine and synthesized speech originating
from the WSJ corpus. They showed that by using relative phase shift (RPS) features it was
possible to decrease the EER from over 81 % to less than 3 %. Unfortunately, the method
proposed was vocoder-dependent. Similarly, phase information was successfully used in
detecting converted speech in [38].
Another generalized method was presented in [2]. It was based on the LBP analysis
of speech cepstrograms and was inspired by an original application to image texture anal-
ysis [28]. In this approach LBP analysis was applied to a Mel-scaled cepstrogram with
appended dynamic features. The authors claimed that modifications made through spoof-
ing disturb the natural ‘texture’ of the speech signal. Experimental results showed that the
LBP-based textrogram analysis was very effective in detecting spoofing trials generated
using speech synthesis (EERs of below 1 %), but it was less effective in detecting those
originating from voice conversion (EER in the order of 7 %).
2.2 Linear prediction theory
Linear prediction theory dates back to the 1940s [33]. It has been used not only in speech
processing, but also in neuroscience and geology [25]. As for speech processing, linear
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prediction was originally used in speech coding, where a technique called linear prediction
coding (LPC) was developed. It consists of calculating the so-called prediction coefficients
ai so that in a frame (e.g., 20ms long) of the input speech signal each signal sample x(n)





aix(n − i) (1)
The difference between the original signal x(n) and the predicted signal xˆ(n) is called




where Ex is the energy of signal x(n) and Ee is the energy of the prediction error e(n), is
called the prediction gain. The higher the gain, the better the signal will be predicted, so
this means that prediction coefficients a1..ap are able to efficiently model the speech signal
within a frame. As a consequence, this will enable a better compression.
The LPC technique is widely used in speech coding, e.g., in GSM 06.10 [11] or in
narrow-band and wide-band adaptive multi-rate coders (AMR) [6]. It can also be used to
parametrize signals in speech or speaker recognition. Linear prediction can also be applied
to vectors, and in such a case, a vector of samples is predicted using another vector of sam-
ples from the signal’s history. This method is called long-term prediction (LTP) in contrast
to LPC, sometimes referred to as short-term prediction. LTP is often used on top of LPC, i.e.,
the LPC error is further processed by LTP. This approach has been encountered in [11], for
example. LTP works especially well for voiced speech, where the signal is quasi-periodic,
so this makes it easier to match a similar vector in the past. Prediction error and prediction
gain for LTP are defined analogously as for LPC.
3 Proposed spoofing countermeasure
The proposed ASV spoofing countermeasure is based on analysis of the prediction error
in the speech signal at the ASV input. One may expect that if a non-natural speech signal
undergoes the prediction process, it may be either “too well” predicted (i.e., with a high
prediction gain) or ineffectively predicted (i.e., with a prediction gain lower than usual).
Figure 1 shows three residual (error) signals left from prediction processing of voiced
speech. It can be observed that the prediction error of a spoof signal generated with voice
conversion (middle) exhibits sudden bursts of errors, probably due to the non-smooth frame
concatenation used (in this case the voice conversion algorithm was based on frame selec-
tion). These bursts are separated by a low energy noise-like prediction error signal, which
may imply a much more efficient prediction than for natural human speech (top figure). The
prediction error of the spoof signal generated with speech synthesis (bottom figure) is also
much weaker and less dynamic than for natural speech. Therefore, the proposed spoofing
countermeasure involves the extraction of various parameters of prediction error, hoping to
capture the features that will help to differentiate genuine from spoof speech signals.
The proposed speech processing process is shown in Fig. 2. It is similar to the speech
coding process used, e.g., in GSM 06.10 coding [11]. The input signal x(n) is first analyzed
using the LPC technique, where the p prediction coefficients ai are estimated. The predicted
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Fig. 1 Residual signal (x′′(n)) at the output of the LTP block for human speech (top), spoof signal S1
generated with voice conversion (middle) and spoof signal S3 generated with speech synthesis (bottom), all
for voiced speech. All signals originated from the ASVspoof 2015 corpus [41] and are described in detail in
Section 4
values are subtracted from the original samples, and the resulting LPC prediction error
signal x′(n) is processed further. The next block, LTP, operates on vectors of samples rather
than on individual samples. When the best matching vector is found, it is subtracted from
signal x′(n), which results in the LTP prediction error signal x′′(n).
It must be stressed that even though the linear prediction technique described above is
well-known, the way it is used in the proposed method is significantly novel. In the classi-
cal application of linear prediction (e.g., in the GSM 06.10 speech coding), the main effort
is invested in minimizing the prediction error, so that the majority (in this case: 2/3) of
the residual (error) samples can be zeroed. In contrast, the prediction coefficients ai are
Fig. 2 Schematic picture of speech processing in the proposed countermeasure
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transmitted further and well protected against transmission errors, because they convey the
majority of the acoustic information. However, in the proposed countermeasure the predic-
tion coefficients are completely disregarded. In contrast, the utmost attention is paid to the
prediction error, as it is claimed that these data carry information about the nature of the
speech signal, i.e., whether it is genuine or artificial.
In order to extract this information, in the proposed approach, the energy of prediction
errors resulting from both blocks and the ratios between them (i.e., LTP prediction gain) are
analyzed. In addition, the temporal distribution of LTP errors is analyzed by measuring the
length of segments with a prediction error above a certain level. In total, 23 parameters are
extracted, which can be divided into three groups:
– Eight parameters related to the LPC error:
– MeanLPCerrAll – mean energy of the LPC error for the whole signal, i.e.,
mean energy of x′(n);
– MaxLPCerrAll – maximum energy of the LPC error for the whole signal;
– MeanLPCerrV – mean energy of the LPC error narrowed down to the voiced
regions;
– MaxLPCerrV – maximum energy of the LPC error for the voiced speech;
– MeanLPCgainAll – mean LPC gain for the whole signal (i.e., mean ratio
between the energies of the input signal and the LPC error, mean Gp as
defined in (2));
– MaxLPCgainAll – maximum LPC gain for the whole signal;
– MeanLPCgainV – mean LPC gain narrowed down to the voiced regions;
– MaxLPCgainV – maximum LPC gain narrowed down to the voiced regions.
– Ten energy-related parameters of the LTP error:
– MeanLTPerrAll – mean energy of the LTP error for the whole signal, i.e.,
mean energy of x′′(n);
– MaxLTPerrAll – maximum energy of the LTP error for the whole signal;
– MeanLTPerrV – mean energy of the LTP error narrowed to voiced regions;
– MaxLTPerrV – maximum energy of the LTP error for voiced regions;
– MeanLTPgainAll – mean LTP gain (i.e., mean ratio between energies of the
LPC and LTP errors);
– MaxLTPgainAll – maximum of the LTP gain;
– MeanLTPgainV – mean LTP gain for voiced speech;
– MaxLTPgainV – maximum LTP gain for voiced speech;
– MeanLTPvar – mean variance of the LTP gain error for the whole signal;
– MaxLTPvar – maximum variance of the LTP gain error for the whole signal.
– Five time-related parameters of the LTP error:
– MeanErrLen – mean length of segments with LTP error above threshold θ ;
– MaxErrLen – maximum length of segments with LTP error above threshold θ ;
– MeanNoErrLen – mean length of segments with LTP error equal to or below
threshold θ ;
– MaxNoErrLen – maximum length of segments with LTP error equal to or
below threshold θ ;
– ErrChangeRate – LTP threshold crossing rate (counted per 20ms frame).
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Time-related parameters of the LTP error were calculated for the whole signal (includ-
ing the regions with no speech activity), as it was suspected that various speech synthesis
artifacts can be visible throughout the whole signal. The initial version of this algorithm,
proposed by [19], used only a 10-element subset of the parameters presented above, mainly
the ones calculated for voiced speech. This version of the anti-spoofing algorithm will
hereinafter be referred to as LPAv1 (linear prediction analysis version 1).
Comparing with LPAv1, in its new version, the parameters calculated for the whole signal
were added, as well as the parameters related to LPC gain and the parameters calculated
based on the variance of the LTP error. The spoofing countermeasure using the full set of 23
parameters proposed in this study will hereinafter be referred to as LPAv2 (linear prediction
analysis version 2).
Figure 3 shows the distributions of the three selected normalized parameters: MaxLTP-
gainAll, MaxErrLenV and MeanLTPvar, for both human and spoof trials. It is noteworthy
that MaxLTPgainAll and MeanLTPvar are the parameters newly added to the improved
LPAv2 version of the algorithm. The distributions show that for spoof trials MaxLTPgainAll
reaches much higher values than for natural speech; the probability distribution for the spoof
trials is close to uniform, while for natural speech the lowest values are by far more probable
than the higher ones. It is believed that such distributions are caused by the higher determin-
ism of synthetic and converted voices. For the same reason, MaxErrLenV values for human
trials are higher – the prediction errors for human speech not only have higher values, but
these high error values also last longer. In contrast, for spoof trials they often take the form
of short-term bursts caused by synthesis artifacts, and are separated by low energy errors.
The third parameter shown in Fig. 3 – MeanLTPvar – is also usually higher for human
speech, because the synthetic speech generation (typical for speech synthesis or voice con-
version) usually results in more steady values for the long-term prediction error, and thus it
returns a lower variance. These clearly visible differences in distributions of the parameters,
extracted based on linear prediction, suggest that spoofing detection using these parameters































































Fig. 3 Histograms of selected features for human (top) and spoof (bottom) trials, for all speech samples in
the Training dataset (S2 excluded). Scale is preserved between the upper and lower row.
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4 Experimental set-up
The experiments were conducted on the corpus provided by the ASVspoof 2015 Chal-
lenge organizers [41]. The corpus, originating from the English Multi-speaker Corpus
for CSTR Voice Cloning Toolkit, contained recordings of various access trials, anno-
tated either as human voice or as a spoof trial. The recordings were divided into three
parts: Training, Development and Evaluation, and consisted of 16,375, 53,372 and 193,404
recordings, respectively. The spoof trials were generated using 10 different spoofing algo-
rithms (S1..S10), based either on speech synthesis (S3, S4, and S10) or on voice conversion
(the remaining ones). Their spoofing efficiency ranged from 25.42 % to 45.79 % EER, with
the exception of S2, which yielded a very low spoofing efficiency equal to 0.87 % EER.
The baseline EER value achieved with the iVectors-PLDA system equaled 0.42 % [41].
The proposed spoof detection system and baseline LBP-based detector were trained
using the Training database. Experiments with spoofing detection, including parameter
tuning, were run using the Development corpus. Since the spoofing efficiency caused by
method S2 was very low, some of the measurements were done on a subset of recordings
without S2 trials. These recordings were also excluded from the training set because pre-
liminary experiments showed that they had a negative impact on the spoofing detection.
The Evaluation corpus was tested to show the performance both for already known and for
previously unseen spoofing algorithms.
To increase granularity, both errors were calculated sample-by-sample and not frame-
wise, which is normally the case in speech coding. Prediction order p and threshold
value θ were set heuristically by swapping the values within a certain range, as shown
in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively. As a result, p was set to two and θ was set to 0.011, as all
the classifiers returned the lowest EER results for these values. The prediction order of two


















Fig. 4 Spoofing detection performance (EER in percentages) against the LPC order, for various classifiers

































































Fig. 5 Spoofing detection performance (EER in percentages) against the LTP error threshold value, for
various classifiers
is a low value and is unlikely to happen in speech coding. We suspect, however, that such
a low order retains the LPC prediction error at a quite high level, and this apparently turns
out to be beneficial in further error processing. This case confirms that the proposed way of
using linear prediction is significantly different from the classical way that linear prediction
is applied, in which the main focus is on minimizing the prediction error.
Contrary to previous research [19], the analysis of the prediction error was run not only
for voiced regions, but for the whole signal. Wherever the analysis was narrowed to voiced
regions, voicing detection was realized using the SWIPE pitch detector [7].
Feature extraction of the baseline LBP-based countermeasure was set up according to
the description in [2]. Each signal was analyzed forming a feature matrix consisting of 16
cepstral coefficients plus energy, their deltas and delta-delta coefficients, which was further
analyzed using 58 possible uniform LBP patterns. As a result, 2842 features were generated
for every recording.
Data analysis showed that the training datasets, obtained using either the LBP or LPA-
based classifiers, contained a substantial number (ca. 10 %) of outliers. Initial experiments
revealed that their presence had a negative impact on the spoofing detection, therefore it was
decided to remove them. A filter based on the interquartile range with outlier factor equal
to 3.0 was applied to detect the outliers. All the parameters, before feeding classifiers, were
normalized.
A range of binary classifiers was used to try to achieve the largest area under the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Based on these results, initially three clas-
sifiers were selected: Logistic, Bayesian Networks and AdaBoosts. The Logistic classifier
used logistic regression with the ridge penalty to classify data [15]. The Bayesian Networks
method used a network of probabilistic dependencies between random variables [29]. The
AdaBoost algorithm is a meta-classifier that iteratively used other “weak” classifiers, such
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Table 1 EER results (in
percentages) of the spoof
detection for various parameter
groups and various classifiers,
for the Development set without
S2 algorithm
Classifiers
Parameters Logistic AdaBoost SVM-RBF
All (LPAv2) 2.697 3.023 1.262
10 prms. (LPAv1) 2.986 3.268 2.714
LPC-based 21.524 21.890 10.321
LTP-energy 16.808 16.834 8.185
LTP-time 8.812 9.028 8.842
as decision trees, and iteratively boosted their performance by exposing them to previously
misclassified items [14].
Since Bayesian Networks yielded the worst results in the previous study [19], they were
subsequently replaced by support vector machines (SVM) with a radial basis function (RBF)
kernel. SVMs, originally proposed in [34], have been used with various kernels (e.g., lin-
ear, polynomial and radial) for data classification in a wide range of studies, e.g., in food
categorization [30], speaker recognition [10, 20] or personality traits recognition based on
handwriting [16]. The RBF kernel [32] is well-known for its high classification power.
Since the SVM-RBF classifier for optimal performance requires a careful adjustment of C
and σ parameters, they were set experimentally using a grid search, similar to that in [31],
separately for each tested configuration of the spoof detector.
Feature extraction was carried out in Matlab, using Voicebox1 as a speech processing
library. Experiments with classification were run using the WEKA toolkit [17] and the
LibSVM toolkit [8].
5 Results
The assessment of anti-spoofing protection was realized independently from any ASV sys-
tem, i.e., each recording underwent a binary decision process to decide, whether a recording
was real human speech or a spoof trial. The actual speaker verification process can take
place either before or after the spoofing detection process and is beyond the scope of this
research.
Similar to many other studies [12, 22], spoofing detection was evaluated by measuring
the EER values. In addition, detection error trade-off (DET) curves were plotted to show the
relation between false alarm and miss probabilities. The EER values and DET plots were
obtained using the Bosaris toolkit.2
Table 1 shows the EER results for the Development set (without S2 algorithm) obtained
using various classifiers and different subsets of parameters. It turned out that the best EER
result achieved in this study was less than 1.3 %, which is much less than the EER of
3 % obtained using the previous approach [19]. The best result was returned for the SVM-
RBF classifier and the complete set of parameters. Any trials with reducing the number of
parameters, e.g., using parameter selection, turned out to worsen the results. Table 1 shows
that using the SVM-RBF classifier with the set of parameters used in the initial version of
1http://www.ee.ic.ac.uk/hp/staff/dmb/voicebox/voicebox.html
2https://sites.google.com/site/bosaristoolkit/
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Table 2 EER results (in percentages) of the spoof detection, for Development and Evaluation datasets, for
various classifiers and the tested countermeasures
Counter- Classifiers
measures Logistic AdaBoost SVM-RBF
Development (S2 excluded)
LBP 11.529 8.065 4.336
LPAv1 2.986 3.268 2.714
LPAv2 2.697 3.023 1.262
Evaluation
LBP 12.389 13.429 11.480
LPAv1 11.616 14.334 12.647
LPAv2 13.623 14.567 7.950
the anti-spoofing algorithm (LPAv1) only slightly improved the results (3.0 % vs. 2.7 %).
When observing the EER results for other groups of parameters one can notice that the
LTP-based parameters seem to be of greater importance than the LPC-based ones.
Table 2 compares the results between the two versions of the LPA algorithm and the
results using the LBP features. The comparison comprised of three classifiers and two
datasets (Development without S2 and the Evaluation sets). For both corpora, the new
version of the anti-spoofing algorithm (LPAv2) outperformed both the previous version
(LPAv1) and the baseline LBP algorithm. The spoofing detection EER for the LBP-based
anti-spoofing for the Development set without S2 reached 4.3 %, while for the proposed
algorithm it was as low as 1.3 %. Again, the best results were achieved for the SVM-RBF
classifier, with the exception of LPAv1 for the Evaluation set, where the Logistic classifier
turned out to be slightly better (11.6 % vs. 12.6 %). It is suspected that the Logistic classifier
in the case of LPAv1 and its 10-dimentional space was more resistant to the unseen spoofing
algorithms than the SVM-RBF classifier. However, for LPAv2 the SVM-RBF classifier per-
formed best both for the known spoofing algorithms (Development) and the mixed known
and new ones (Evaluation).
Figure 6 displays the countermeasure performance for the Evaluation dataset for vari-
ous spoofing algorithms, as well as the line showing how harmful each of these algorithms
was. Unsurprisingly, the algorithms that were present in the Training corpus (S1, S3, S4
and S5) in most of the cases were also detected best by the tested algorithms. Algorithm S4,
using speech synthesis with STRAIGHT vocoder [21], was the easiest to detect – the LPAv2
algorithm yielded here less than 1 %. In addition, spoofing algorithm S8, using voice con-
version, was detected with high accuracy (EER below 2 %), even though it was not present
in the Training database. The remaining spoofing algorithms, not present in the Training
dataset, were detected with higher EERs, which is confirmed in Table 3. For example, the
S2 algorithm was detected by the proposed method with an EER equal to 11.2 %, but as a
matter of fact this number is of low importance, since the spoofing efficiency of this algo-
rithm was as low as 0.9 %. In contrast, a very efficient spoofing algorithm S10, based on
the MARY Text-To-Speech system,3 turned out to be the most difficult to detect, which was
3http://mary.dfki.de/
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Fig. 6 Spoofing performance (solid line) along with LPAv1 and LPAv2 countermeasure performance (left
and right bars, respectively) for various spoofing algorithms from the Evaluation dataset
most likely due to a lack of vocoder. However even here, the EER returned by the proposed
system equaled 18.6 %, which is much lower than the spoofing efficiency of S10: 45.8 %.
We observed no correlation between the detection results for the spoofing signals gener-
ated using different vocoders, i.e., for S5 (using the MLSA vocoder) and, e.g., S4 and S8
(using the STRAIGHT vocoder), which returned EER values of 1.4 %, 1.0 % and 2.0 %,
respectively. This suggests that the proposed solution is vocoder-independent.
The anti-spoofing protection proposed in this article outperformed the previous ver-
sion [19] for most of the spoofing algorithms, apart from S3 and S4, where the results
were in fact the same. The difference in performance is especially visible as for the voice
conversion-based spoofing methods (see Table 3). The average spoofing detection efficacy
for speech synthesis attacks (algorithms: S3, S4 and S10) was almost the same for LPAv1
and LPAv2.
When comparing the LPAv2 with the LBP-based spoofing countermeasure, the LPAv2
results were better both for known and previously unseen spoofing algorithms (EER equaled
Table 3 Spoofing and
countermeasure performance
(EER in percentages) for
Evaluation dataset, for the LBP,
LPAv1 and LPAv2
countermeasures
Spoof.alg. Spoof.perf. LBP LPAv1 LPAv2
Known 30.675 3.941 1.859 1.217
New 28.377 13.496 15.631 10.206
Conversion 27.616 7.438 11.362 6.581
Synthesis 33.217 14.891 7.229 7.240
Average 29.296 9.674 10.122 6.611
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Fig. 7 DET plots for the three analyzed countermeasures, tested on the Development set without S2
1.2 % and 10.2 % vs. 1.9 % and 15.6 %, for the LPAv2 and LBP algorithms, respectively).
However, when it came to comparing individual spoofing algorithms, it turned out that for
three spoofing algorithms (S6, S7 and S9) the LBP-based countermeasure returned better
results. For example, for algorithm S6, the returned EER results were 10.2 % and 13.3 %
for LBP and LPAv2, respectively. What is worth noting is that all these algorithms were
not present in the training set. In contrast, the LPAv2 anti-spoofing method returned much
better results for other unseen algorithms (S2, S8, S10), so at this stage it would be difficult
to definitively judge which of these two algorithms has better generalization capabilities.
The DET plots, shown in Fig. 7 for the Development corpus without S2, confirmed the
good spoofing detection capabilities of the proposed LPAv2 algorithm. The DET curve of
LPAv2 is convex and closest to the coordinate origin, while the DET curves for the LBP and
LPAv1 countermeasures are close to straight, and placed at a larger distance from the (0,0)
point. The DET plot for LPAv2 indicates, however, that the proposed countermeasure was
not able to decrease the miss probability below ca. 0.5 %.
6 Conclusions and future work
This article presented a new version of the algorithm that aimed to increase the anti-spoofing
protection of speaker verification systems against unauthorized access using speech synthe-
sis, voice conversion and, potentially, other attacks. The results shown in this paper were
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compared with the previous version of this algorithm (LPAv1) as well as with the LBP-based
anti-spoofing method.
The proposed spoofing countermeasure is based on analysis of prediction error, which
results from cascaded LPC and LTP blocks. As the LP-based vocoder is often a part of
speech synthesis or voice conversion systems, by using linear prediction analysis in some
sense a reverse operation is performed, to verify if vocoding really took place.
The described new version of the countermeasure, called LPAv2, uses an extended set of
parameters – 23 instead of 10, including LPC gain and variance of LTP error, as well as the
parameters extracted from the whole speech signal (and not only from the voiced speech as
in LPAv1). The new version employs a more powerful classifier (SVM-RBF), in which the
parameters were tuned to maximize the detection efficiency.
It turned out that the proposed version, with an enlarged number of parameters and the
SVM-RBF classifier, was able to improve the EER results by lowering them from 3 % for
LPAv1 down to 1.3 %, when using the Development corpus without S2. The analyses shown
in this study suggest that the LTP-based parameters contributed most to successful spoofing
detection.
In addition, the results for the Evaluation dataset were better: 8 % for LPAv2 vs. 11.6 %
for LPAv1. Some scientists have reported better results here, e.g., [18] used a classical
GMM-based system that returned an EER of 3 %. However, a huge difference between the
performance for the known attacks (1.2 % EER) and the unknown ones (10.2 % EER) may
imply that the proposed algorithm requires further parameter tuning to be able to better
detect previously unseen spoofing algorithms.
In most of the cases, the proposed method performed better than a baseline LBP-based
detector. It is likely that the LBP detector required longer speech data, as in [2] it was tested
on 5 min. recordings, while the recordings tested in the current study were no longer than
several seconds. For three out of 10 spoofing algorithms present in the Evaluation dataset,
the results using the LBP-based features and the SVM-RBF classifier outperformed the
proposed method. It would be interesting to know if the fusion of scores returned by the
LBP and LPAv2 countermeasures would lead to an increase in the spoofing detection – this
may be a subject for future work.
It is hoped that the improved version of the spoofing countermeasure, based on an anal-
ysis of prediction error, as well as the analyses presented in this article, will help to increase
the security of speaker verification systems. Future work can focus on elaborating a gen-
eralized countermeasure able to precisely detect a wide range of spoofing attacks against
ASV systems, in which the proposed algorithm can be one of the contributing elements.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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